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TIMOTHY ATKESON*

The Foreign Corrupt Practices

Act of 1977: An International
Application of SEC's Corporate
Governance Reforms
Despite the troubling aspects of the information concerning past questionable or illegal payments, the Commission believes that there is a considerable basisfrom which
to conclude that the situation is improving. .

.

. This optimism rests both on the

declarations of cessation, already mentioned, and, more fundamentally on the "new
governance" concept that the Commission's enforcement and disclosure programs
are attempting to instill and its legislative and other proposals are designed to
enhance.
Securities and Exchange Commission Report on
Questionable and Illegal Corporate
Payments and Practices
May 12, 1976
I. The U.S. Ends a Three Year Debate by Enacting the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
There can be no doubt that "sensitive" payments by U.S. corporations
abroad have been for a number of years-and continue to be-a highly sensitive subject in Washington. The experience of G. William Miller,, formerly
head of Textron, who was confronted during hearings on his nomination to
become Chairman of the Federal Reserve with charges concerning a questionable payment by a Textron subsidiary in Iran in 1973, illustrates the continuing exposure of U.S. multinational businesses to challenge on this subject.
Miller's word that he had no knowledge of the 1973 transaction or whether it
could have taken place as charged was ultimately accepted after weeks' delay,
and he has been confirmed by the Senate. A new law passed by Congress last
December makes it highly likely that U.S. multinational corporate executives
will be much better equipped henceforth to deal with such challenges on the
basis of strengthened corporate controls relative to such problems.
*J.D. Yale University; Partner, Steptoc & Johnson, Washington, D.C.; Chairman, ABA, Committee on Multinational Corporations, Section on International Law
'See Washington Post, Jan. 25, 1978, § D at 8, col. 4.
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After three years of debate' on the appropriate U.S. legislative response and

enactment of measures addressed to arms sales3 and tax aspects' of problems
of foreign corruption, Congress passed and the President signed on December
19, 1977 the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.1 Debate concerning this

legislation had focused largely on the alternatives of making bribery of foreign
government officials or political parties a crime under U.S. law, or of setting
up a system of U.S. reporting and disclosure to discourage such practices. Also

present in the legislation, however, are Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) authored provisions relating to the integrity of corporate books and
records and adequacy of internal accounting controls that are likely in the long
run to have much greater significance. These will require U.S. multinationals
to apply to their worldwide operations a number of the still-evolving reforms
of corporate governance advocated by the SEC. Foreign corporations with
issues registered with the SEC must also address these requirements. The problems and conflicts for both the foreign operations of U.S. companies and
foreign issuers subject to SEC jurisdiction in applying such "new
governance," new accounting controls and new extraterritorial requirements

of U.S. law may be substantial.
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act has two main groups of provisions:
(i) Section 102 (Accounting Standards) establishes Federal standards for the

integrity of the books and records and internal accounting controls of SEC
regulated issuers; 6
(ii) Sections 103 and 104 (Foreign Corrupt Practices by Issuers and by

Domestic Concerns) make bribery of foreign government officials, candidates,
or political parties by SEC regulated issuers or by U.S. "domestic concerns"

not regulated by the SEC a crime under U.S. law carrying fines of up to $1

'The first measure adopted was Senate Resolution 265 which passed the Senate 93-0 on Nov. 12,
1975. S. Res. 265, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 Cong. Rec. § 19812-13 (1975). This directed the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations and other U.S. officials to negotiate in the
General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) and other appropriate international fora an international code of conduct eliminating the use of improper payments.
'International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-329,
§ 604, 90 Stat. 729 (amending 22 U.S.C. §2776 (Supp. V. 1975)); 22 C.F.R. §§ 130.01-.33 (1977).
'Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1065, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified in I.R.C. § 952
(1977)).
'Pub. L. No. 95-213, tit. I, 91 Stat. 1494 (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 78q(b), 78dd, 78ff(a) (1976));
the Act became effective on signature. The Act was S. 305 prior to passage; during the previous
Congress the predecessor bill passed by the Senate, but not acted on in the House, was S. 3664.
The House version, incorporated in part into the final form of S. 305, was contained in H.R. 3815.
'There is a national security exception to § 102 for any person acting in cooperation with and at
the specific written directive of any federal agency (such as the CIA) which has presidential
authority to issue such directives. Summaries of such directives are to be reported annually to the
Intelligence Oversight Committees of Congress. The written directives expire after one year if not
renewed. Pub. L. No. 95-213, tit. I, § 102(3), 91 Stat. 1494-95 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78q(b)
(1976)).
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million for the business entity and felony jail terms and $10,000 fines for the
individuals involved.7
Although the SEC was initially reluctant to take a position on the criminalization of foreign bribery provisions, it has ended up with investigatory and civil
enforcement responsibilities for all SEC regulated issuers under both the accounting and antibribery portions of the Act.
Throughout this period the United States has been seeking international
agreements and cooperation as a solution to the problem of corruption in one
country in which nationals or corporations from other countries are involved.I
In connection with U.S. or foreign government investigations of particular
companies, the U.S. has signed more than a dozen bilateral executive
agreements' on exchange of information. It has expanded the coverage of recent extradition treaties'" to address foreign corruption issues and appears to
be willing to make similar extensions in other extradition treaties. The
multilateral treaty proposal, which the United States introduced in the United
Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC), in March
1976, has subsequently evolved into a draft agreement now being discussed
under United Nations Economic and Social Council (UNECSOC) auspices.
Current U.S. proposals include:

'Section 6 of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation Amendments Act of 1978 (H.R.
9179) would also deny recovery on future OPIC investment guarantees where the "preponderant
cause" of loss was the insured's violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and would suspend
for five years the eligibility for new Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) support of
any person convicted of bribery under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act with respect to an OPIC
supported project.
'In March 1976, the U.S. proposed an international agreement on illicit payments to the meeting
of the U.N. Commission on Transnational Corporations. This proposal was forwarded to the
U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) which set up an Ad Hoc Inter-Governmental
Working Group to develop this agreement. U.N. Economic and Social Council, Report of the Ad
Hoc Inter-Governmental Working Group on the Problem of Corrupt Practices in International
Commercial Transactions, U.N. Doc. E/6006 (July 5, 1977), reprinted in 16 INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL MATERIALS 1236 (Sept. 1977). Later in 1976 the United States took the lead in introducing
into the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises a guideline on the subjects of bribery, extortion, political contributions and improper involvement by multinational enterprises and local
political activities. Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, June
21, 1976, Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, Annex-Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises.
'E.g., Procedures for Mutual Assistance in Administration of Justice in Connection with the
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation Matter, March 23, 1976, United States-Japan, T.I.A.S. No. 8233.
"Treaty on Extradition, signed March 3, 1977, United States-Japan, Department of State, Office of Treaty Information (treaty has not been ratified by the Senate). The extraditable crimes
listed in the schedule to this treaty include bribery, extortion, offenses relating to false statements
and perjury, offenses against the laws relating to the control of public elections or political contributions and expenditures, offenses against the laws relating to the control of companies or other
corporations and offenses against the laws relating to the control of exportation and importation
or international transfer of funds. Both countries retain discretion as to whether to extradite their
own nationals.
International Lawyer, Vol. 12, No. 4

706

INTERNATIONAL LA WYER

(i) Commitment by all nations to make bribery of foreign government officials and extortion in connection with international sales to governments illegal;
(ii) Commitment by home countries to prosecute or extradite offenders;
(iii) Record keeping on fees paid to intermediaries in such sales with government access to such records; and
(iv) Exchange of information and cooperation in enforcement of antibribery laws.
The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), a federation of national
business groups headquartered in Paris, has arrived at a voluntary business
code I I on extortion and bribery (including commercial bribery directed against
competitors). The ICC is setting up a panel to interpret, promote and oversee
application of this Code and is in the final process of delineating the panel's
functions and procedures. The governments of several Persian Gulf states
have taken an interest in the ICC panel and might welcome its assistance as an
adjunct to their own efforts to regulate the size of sales commissions and the
use of influence in sales to governmental agencies.
Despite prolonged and considerable effort on the part of the United States,
however, there has been relatively little progress toward arriving at a consensus
about either national or multilateral anticorruption measures. It is likely that
for some time to come the several U.S. programs in this area will be the most
rigorous and visible. Given the applicability of the Freedom of Information
Act to much of the SEC's investigatory record,I 2 continuing SEC requirement
of disclosure of "material" questionable payments, the reporting and regula.
tion of arms sales transactions under the Arms Export Control Act, 3 the
likelihood of more extensive investigation and review with corporate audit
committees"' of foreign corruption issues by independent auditors responding
to Section 102 of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and to new auditing standards promulgated by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants

"International Chamber of Commerce, Extortion and Bribery in Business Transactions, Doc.
No. 192/44 (December 2, 1977).
"SEC, Freedom of Information Act Release No. 53, April 28, 1977, 12 SEC Docket 278 (May
10, 1977); SEC, Freedom of Information Act Release No. 55, Nov. 21, 1977, 13 SEC Docket 918
(Dec. 6, 1977). Dresser Industries, to protect its employees abroad, has instituted suit to require
that the SEC-Justice Task Force investigating questionable payments already reported take steps
to prevent disclosure of names of recipients of payments and identification of their countries.
Dresser Industries, News Release, March 6, 1978. The SEC did not require such specificity of
disclosure in its "voluntary" program.
"122 C.F.R. §§ 130.01-.33 (1977).
"Implementing another SEC corporate governance recommendation, the New York Stock Exchange will require all domestic companies with stock listed on the Exchange to establish audit
committees composed of independent directors not later than June 30, 1978. SEC Release No.
13346 (March 9, 1977).
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 12, No. 4
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(AICPA),II there is likely to be continuing pressure to apply the latest reforms
to all U.S. business operations worldwide regardless of the foreign response.
At the same time, those foreign corporations with stock registered with the
SEC, which as "issuers" are now subject to the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, will be forced to consider the applicability of the American reforms
regardless of the position of their home governments.
H. Section 102's Rules on Integrity of Corporate
Books and Internal Accounting Controls
The SEC, notwithstanding questions by commentators as to whether it was
not overburdening both its primary role of protecting the investor and traditional concepts of materiality requiring disclosure,16 has been the principal
federal agency publicizing and taking action against questionable foreign
payments. Its initial investigations were directed at domestic questionable
payments by certain U.S. corporations as a result of leads from the Watergate
Special Prosecutor's office. These in turn revealed slush funds and questionable payments abroad. Ultimately hundreds of corporations disclosed
hundreds of millions of dollars in questionable payments of both types in
response to SEC civil enforcement actions or the SEC's "voluntary" program
for disclosure and self correction. By May 1976, when the SEC issued its
report" to the Senate Banking Committee (SBC) on questionable foreign
payments by companies registered with the SEC, the SEC had achieved far
more detailed knowledge about the foreign payments problem and vastly more
credibility on this subject with Congress than any other government agency.
Predictably, the SEC's seemingly modest proposal for Federal legislation on
the integrity of corporate books and the adequacy of internal accounting controls, which ultimately became Section 102 of the Act, was promptly espoused
by the SBC. Also predictably, without an SEC recommendation on the subject of disclosure versus criminalization of foreign bribery, the subsequent
Richardson Task Force legislative proposals,"8 suggesting a system of report"See generally AMERICAN

INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

TION OF STATEMENTS ON AUDITING STANDARDS-NUMBERS 1 TO

(AICPA),

CODIFICA-

21 (1978).

'See Prohibiting Bribes to Foreign Officials: Hearings on S. 3133, S. 3379, and S. 3418 Before
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (May 18,
1976) (Letter from Elliot L. Richardson, Secretary of Commerce, providing comments of the Task
Force on Questionable Corporate Payments Abroad). See also Note, Disclosure of Payments to
Foreign Government Officials Under the Securities Acts, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1848 (1976); Note,
Foreign Bribes and the Securities Acts' Disclosure Requirements, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1222 (1976).
"SEC, REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES, sub-

mitted to the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, May 12, 1976, 642 FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH), Part II (May 19, 1976).
"Prohibiting Bribes to Foreign Officials: Hearings on S. 3133, S. 3379, and S. 3418 Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (May 18, 1976)
(Letter from Elliott L. Richardson, Secretary of Commerce, providing comments of the Task
Force on Questionable Corporate Payments Abroad).
International Lawyer, Vol. 12, No. 4
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ing and disclosure as the answer to the problem of foreign questionable
payments, were all the more likely to be ignored by a Democratic Congress in
an election year.
Although there is considerable evidence that the problem has been one of
circumvention of corporate controls rather than lack of controls, the SEC
placed its reliance on proposals to make falsification of corporate books and
deception of auditors federal crimes and to establish federal statutory standards for corporate books, records and accounts and systems of internal accounting controls. The SEC took the proposed standard for internal accounting controls from the goals for such controls set in AICPA, Statement on
Auditing Standards (SAS) 1 (codified in AICPA, Codification of Statements
on Auditing Standards, at § 320.28).1 9 Little attention was given in either the
SEC report to the SBC or in the SBC's 21 reports in 1976 or 1977 on its drafts of
Section 102 of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as to the implications of incorporating such generalized standards in a federal statute. Since the SEC
subsequently asserted it could issue rules to the same effect under existing
authority, it perhaps viewed legislation on the subject as surplusage.2 '
As legislation, however, these standards give the SEC a very broad additional base for its enforcement actions which it has promptly utilized.2 2 They
also invite extensive SEC rulemaking with respect to corporate accounting and
auditing. In addition, they open up new possibilities for stockholder suits
against any management deemed to have failed to meet the statutory requirements and for federal court opinions interpreting these requirements.2
Finally, together with the responsibilities assigned the SEC with respect to
foreign bribery by SEC regulated issuers in Section 103, the Section 102 provisions confirm the SEC in its self-appointed role of applying its evolving concepts of corporate governance reforms to the worldwide operations of U.S.
multinationals as well as to the operations of foreign issuers registered with the
SEC.
"SEC, REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE PAYMENTS, supra note 17, at 59.
2
Section 102 originated in the Senate and was adopted in Conference. The House Commerce
Committee advocated that the SEC deal with these issues by rulemaking under existing authority.
See COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES. H. CONF. REP. No. 95-831, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1976).
"SEC, Rel. No. 34-13185, Questionable or Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices, 42 Fed.
Reg. 4854 (1977).
22
SEC v. Aminex, an enforcement action for violation of Sec. 102 accounting standards with no
foreign bribery aspects. N.Y. Times, March 11, 1978, at 28 col. 4. The SEC has since utilized Section 102 in a foreign payments case against Page Airways.
"The Senate Banking Committee in its report on S. 3664, the 1976 predecessor to S. 305, deleted
a provision creating a new shareholder's right of action "largely because the Committee believes that this would have duplicated and possibly confused existing remedies available to
shareholders." SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, CORRUPT OVERSEAS
PAYMENTS BY U.S. BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, S. REP. No. 94-1031, 94th Cong., 2d Session 12-13

(1976).
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With respect to corporate books and records, the initial proposal of the SEC
and the SBC bill required books, records and accounts which "accurately"
and fairly reflected the transactions and dispositions of the assets of an issuer
registered with the SEC. In conference, this obligation was qualified with the
words in reasonable detail to avoid connotations of a "degree of exactitude
and precision which is unrealistic." 2 ' The Conferees further explained the objective of this requirement as being to "prevent off-the-books slush funds and
payments of bribes."
The amendment makes clear that the issuer's records should reflect transactions in
conformity with accepted methods of recording economic events and effectively prevent off-the-books slush funds and payments of bribes.2"
With respect to internal accounting controls, Section 102 in the Senate bill
adopted the SEC proposed provision requiring issuers to devise and maintain
"adequate" systems of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide
reasonable assurance that, among other objectives, transactions are recorded
as necessary to maintain accountability for assets. In conference, the word
adequate was deleted with the explanation that "the precise requirements of
the system of internal accounting controls to be maintained by the issuer are
set forth in specific terms in the statute ... "26 The SBC report states that a
rule of reason is to be applied in evaluating the degree of internal accounting
controls required but does not address the problem that the standard of
reasonableness applied is likely to be the test of hindsight after a "reasonable"
system of controls has suffered a failure:
The committee recognizes ...that management must exercise judgment in determining the steps to be taken, and the cost incurred, in giving assurance that the objectives
expressed will be achieved. Here standards of reasonableness must apply .... While
management should observe every reasonable prudence in satisfying the objectives
called for in new paragraph (2) of section 13(b), the committee recognizes that
management must necessarily estimate and evaluate the cost/benefit relationships of
the steps to be taken in fulfillment of its responsibilities under this paragraph. The accounting profession will be expected to use their professional judgment in evaluating
the systems maintained by issuers. The size of the business, diversity of operations,
degree of centralization of financial and operating management, amount of contact
by top management with day-to-day operations, and numerous other circumstances

"COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 95-831, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977). In its report on S. 3664, the 1976 predecessor to S. 305, the Senate
Banking Committee had explained, "The term 'accurately' does not mean exact precision as
measured by some abstract principle. Rather, it means that an issuer's records should be kept according to accepted methods of recording economic events. Thus, for example, recording
depreciation in a manner permitted by the Internal Revenue Code may not be a precise measurement, but it is nevertheless clearly a permissible one within the intent of subparagraph (2)."
SENATE COMM. ON BANKING. HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, CORRUPT OVERSEAS PAYMENTS by U.S.
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, S. REP. No. 94-1031, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11(1976).

"Ibid.

36Ibid.
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are factors which management must
consider in establishing and maintaining an in27
ternal accounting controls system.

Three AICPA Statements on Auditing Standards28 (SAS) issued in 1977
shed light on how independent auditors may be expected to respond to Section
102. With respect. to any material weakness in internal accounting controls that
comes to the auditor's attention, SAS 20 states a duty to communicate to
senior management and the board of directors or its audit committee,
regardless of whether the auditor was specifically engaged to review and report
on the client's system of internal accounting control. Section 102, in the light
of the goals set in its legislative history, is likely to broaden what are regarded
as weaknesses in internal accounting controls which must be reported; it also
may in time be supplemented to require some affirmative opinion by the
auditor to management and the audit committee as to the adequacy of the
client's system of internal accounting control. Given the evidence that corrupt
payments have been accomplished by a great variety of techniques, 2 ' it may
also be anticipated that auditors and audit committees will seek more detailed
and explicit review of internal accounting control systems, require a greater
variety of tests to check performance and make more extensive requirements
of any foreign auditors examining the internal accounting controls of foreign
subsidiaries of the same client.1° From a management point of view, SAS 20
combined with Section 102, makes a comprehensive review of any corporation's internal accounting control systems a high priority undertaking in 1978.
SAS 17 on the duty of auditors when encountering illegal acts by clients suggests questions auditors are likely to raise with respect to both the Section 102
and 103 provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 3' What representa"SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES AND

DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT IMPROVED DISCLOSURE ACTS OF 1977, S. REP. No. 95-114,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1977).
"1AICPA, Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) 16, The Independent Auditor's Responsibility for the Detection of Errors or Irregularities (Jan. 1977), codified in AICPA, Codification of
Statements on Auditing Standards, supra note 15, Sec. 327; SAS 17, Illegal Acts by Clients (Jan.
1977), codtfied in AICPA, Codification of Statements on Auditing Standards, supra note 15,
§ 328; SAS 20, Required Communication of Material Weaknesses in Internal Accounting Control
(Aug. 1977), codified in AICPA, Codification of Statements on Auditing Standards, supra note
15, § 323.

"Accounting Ruses Used in Disguising Dubious Payments, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1978, § D
(Business/Finance), at 1.
"In its report to the Senate Banking Committee of May 1976, supra note 16, at 49, the SEC
summarized the independent auditor's duty as follows:
The independent accountant's responsibility is to certify that the financial statements of a corporation are fairly presented in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. Accountants are not free to close their eyes to facts that come to their attention, and in order prop-

erly to satisfy their obligations, they must be reasonably sure that corporate books and records
arefreefrom defects that might compromise the validity of these statements. (Emphasis added.)
'The SEC cited the draft of SAS 17 to the Senate Banking Committee in its report of May 1976
as an illustration "that the initiative and professional competence in the accounting profession are

International Lawyer, Vol. 12, No. 4

The Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct of 1977

711

tions from management should be obtained as to possible violations of laws
and regulations of foreign countries? Do any such violations of law abroad require the establishment of material loss contingencies against possible expropriation or enforced discontinuance of operations in a foreign country?
Has there been adequate disclosure in the financial statements of the potential
effects of any material illegal act on the operations of the entity? Must the
auditor qualify his opinion because of persisting uncertainty as to the extent of
a circumvention of internal control systems or refusal of the client's legal
counsel to advise on the illegality of an act that may not be financially
material? If the auditor is not satisfied with management's consideration of
possible illegal acts, he must consider withdrawing from the engagement. Any
such change in auditing arrangements would have to be promptly reported to
the SEC in a Form 8-K report together with the reasons for the change.
In final action on a rulemaking which has been pending since January
1977, the SEC is expected to supplement the accounting and audit provisions
of Section 102 of the Foreign Corrupt Payments Act in two respects where the
conferees held back from action the SEC had originally proposed. In its 1976
report the SEC had endorsed provisions3" that made it a crime for any person
(i) to falsify any book, record, or account required to be made for any accounting purpose; or
(ii) to make a materially false or misleading statement to an accountant in
connection with any audit or to omit to state, or cause another person to omit,
any material fact necessary in order to make statements to an accountant not
misleading.
The SBC adopted these provisions, but only with the additional requirement
that the offense be done "knowingly." In conference, rather than address the
Supreme Court's requirement for scienter in such SEC-related cases as Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), the conferees dropped these two

a significant resource in our continuing program relating to questionable or illegal foreign or
domestic payments." SEC, REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE PAYMENTS, supra note 17, at 54.
"See ABA, Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Requests for Information, Jan. 15, 1976. 31 Bus. LAW. 1709 (1976). The ABA policy statement draws a distinction
between litigation which is pending or imminent (on which counsel's evaluation may be given to
the auditor with the consent of the client) and "contingencies of a legal nature or having legal
aspects" (on which counsel should not be asked for an evaluation). Note that counsel has a duty to
advise a client as to the need for disclosure of a wide variety of events and circumstances and may
not knowingly participate in a violation by a client of any disclosure requirement under the
securities laws.
"SEC, Rel. No. 34-13185, QUESTIONABLE OR ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES, 42
Fed. Reg. 4854 (1977). In this proposed rulemaking the SEC limited those covered by the rule on
misleading auditors to officers, directors or shareholders of the issuer rather than the broader
group of "any pers6n" included in the language it originally submitted to the Senate Banking
Committee. 42 Fed. Reg. 4857-58.
"SEC, REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE PAYMENTS, supra note 17, at 65-66.
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provisions (stating that "no inference should be drawn with respect to any
rulemaking authority the SEC may or may not have under the securities

laws"). 5 the forthcoming SEC rule is expected to specify these offenses without a "knowingly" requirement. The SEC has already, in reliance on the
House Commerce Committee report, announced that "a negligence standard
will govern civil injunctive actions brought to enforce the Act." 36 Whether the
forthcoming rule also adopts other SEC-proposed requirements for proxy
statement disclosure of the extent of involvement of top management in questionable payments and the existence of formal corporate policy statements on
such matters is less certain.
Apparently the SEC plans no further action at this time beyond decision on
its pending rulemaking to elaborate or clarify the requirements of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act. This means that for the near future the legal and accounting professions will have to provide most of the guidance to clients on the
numerous unresolved practical questions arising under the Act.

Among these questions will be the application of the new Section 102 rules
in the context of the varying degrees of control and ownership issuers hold in
foreign corporations. The requirements of Section 102 are not related

specifically to corporations having foreign operations or transactions nor is
any reference made to foreign subsidiaries. Instead, Section 102 requires
books and records which reflect the transactions and disposition of the assets
of the "issuer" and internal accounting controls for the transactions and
assets of the issuer. Although the criminal provisions of Sections 103 and 104
were shaped in conference specifically so as not to apply directly to foreign

subsidiaries, the legislative history 7 indicates that the books and records and
accounting provisions of Section 102 were intended to operate on such foreign
subsidiaries to an extent that must be clarified." Similarly, the application of
"COMMITrEE OF CONFERENCE, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES supra note 24, at 11-12. The House
Report states that "the Committee intends that no proof of scienter be required in a Commission
enforcement action brought under the provisions of this bill. . . ." HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE
AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, UNLAWFUL CORPORATE PAYMENTS ACT OF 1977, H. REP. No. 95-640,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977).
"SEC, Accounting Series Release No. 242, Feb. 16, 1978, 14 SEC Docket 180 (Feb. 28, 1978)
(Notification of the enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977).
"SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES AND

1977, supra note 27, at 11.
"But a U.S. company which 'looks the other way' in order to be able to raise the defense that they
were ignorant of bribes made by a foreign subsidiary, could be in violation of Section 102 requiring companies to devise and maintain adequate accounting controls. Under the accounting section
no off-the-books accounting fund could be lawfully maintained, either by a U.S. parent or by a
foreign subsidiary, and no improper payment could be lawfully disguised"; 123 CONG. REC.
S 19,401 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Tower). "The Senate felt that ... it would be
unrealistic to attempt to extend the law's prohibitions to foreign subsidiaries. Moreover, their actions would be substantially curtailed by section 102 of the bill, which would require the U.S.
parent to closely oversee its accounting practices."
"Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (codified in U.S.C. 78m(b)(1976)) authorizes
DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT IMPROVED DISCLOSURE ACTS OF
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Section 102 to foreign companies whose issues are registered with the SEC
39
must be considered.
HI. Sections 103 and 104: Criminalization of Bribery of
Foreign Government Officials, Candidates or
Political Parties by U.S. Businesses
In Sections 103 and 104 the crime of bribery of foreign government officials,
candidates or political parties is defined as the issuer's or domestic concern's
use of an instrumentality of interstate commerce "corruptly" in furtherance
of an offer or payment of anything of value to influence
(i) a foreign official,
(ii) a foreign political party or candidate, or
(iii) any person, "while knowing or having reason to know" that all or a
portion of such money or thing of value will be utilized for payments to
foreign officials or political parties, to assist the issuer or domestic concern in
obtaining or retaining business or directing business to any other person.
United States extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction under the legislation is
premised on an offense committed by a domestic or foreign issuer subject to
SEC jurisdiction or by any "domestic concern" (which includes any individual
who is a citizen, national or resident of the United States and any business entity which has its principal place of business in the United States on which is
organized under United States law) which involves "use of the mails or any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce ... in furtherance of" a corrupt payment. "In furtherance" was intended to make clear that the use of interstate commerce need only be in furtherance (e.g., authorization, negotiation, concealment, etc.) of making the corrupt payment 4rather than necessarily as the vehicle for making the corrupt payment itself. '
In addition to the criminal liability of the business entity, there is individual
criminal liability for participation in a willful violation by officers, directors
and stockholders acting on the entity's behalf as well as by employees or agents
where their employing entity is also found guilty of a violation of the Act.
the Commission to prescribe the forms in which required information is to be set out and to determine whether it is necessary or desirable to have "separate and/or consolidated balance sheets or
income accounts of any person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by the issuer, or any
person under direct or indirect common control with the issuer . . ." Consolidation of a subsidiary's accounts with the parent's would appear to create a strong case for application of Section
102 to both.
"The jurisdiction the U.S. may properly exercise under international law to apply U.S.
securities regulations to the essentially foreign operations of foreign issuers registered with the
SEC was not considered during passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. It remains,
however, a significant unresolved question. Note, American Adjudication of Transnational
Securities Fraud, 89 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1976).
"COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES, supra note 24, at 12.
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Fines on individuals under the Act may not be reimbursed by their employer.
As noted, most of the debate over the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
centered on whether foreign bribery should be "criminalized" or dealt with by
disclosure requirements. The Ford Administration's disclosure proposals
presented by an Interagency Task Force led by Secretary of Commerce
Richardson" and the substantial objections raised by both the Richardson
Task Force and the Association of the Bar of the City of New York'" with
respect to the extraterritorial criminal provisions were ultimately rejected. The
Association of the Bar of the City of New York had argued' 3 against extraterritorial criminalization citing:
(1)
the traditional principle that states should not extend their criminal laws to extraterritorial conduct; (2)the difficulties inherent in prosecution based on acts done
abroad; (3) the burdens on a defendant which are created by imposing criminal
penalties for acts done abroad and which raise significant constitutional questions of
fairness and due process; and (4) deference to the principle of comity between nations, a principle which may be offended by prosecution for extraterritorial crimes.

The SBC had contended" that a criminal prohibition was necessary to emphasize national policy and that a disclosure requirement would have comparable enforcement problems:
The Committee carefully weighed these arguments and decided that a direct
criminal prohibition is the better approach. As the Richardson Task Force itself
pointed out, a direct criminal prohibition of foreign bribes "would represent the most
forceful possible rhetorical assertion by the President and the Congress of our abhorrence of such conduct. It would place business executives on clear and unequivocal

notice that such practices should stop. It would make it easier for some corporations
to resist pressures to make questionable payments." On the other hand, merely requiring the disclosure of bribes would leave ambiguous whether such payments might
be acceptable. Indeed, it would imply that bribery can be condoned as long as it is
disclosed.

The Committee considered whether a criminal prohibition might be more difficult
to enforce than a disclosure requirement. The Committee concluded that an outright
prohibition would be at least as feasible to enforce as any meaningful disclosure re-

quirement.

The argument that a criminalization approach was the most direct and effective way to declare U.S. public policy in this area and would involve less administrative effort and expense for both government and business than a
reporting and disclosure system was ultimately decisive."' With the criminal
"Supra note 17.
"1THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE FOREIGN
PAYMENTS BY CORPORATIONS: THE PROBLEM AND APPROACHES TO A SOLUTION,

March 14, 1977.

"Id. at 5.
"SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, CORRUPT OVERSEAS PAYMENTS BY

U.S. BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, supra note 23, at 8.
""The committee believes the criminalization approach to be the most effective deterrent, the
least burdensome on business, and no more difficult to enforce than disclosure." HOUSE COMM.
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provision of Sections 103 and 104 now in place the United States becomes the
first "home" country in the world to apply criminal sanctions to the behavior
of its multinational corporations abroad in their dealings with officials of
"host" countries.
Although both Senate and House drafts of the Act took the criminalization
approach, there remained considerable debate in conference as to whether the
Act should be made applicable to foreign subsidiaries. The Senate bill applied
to SEC registered issuers and domestic concerns having their principal place of
business in the United States or chartered under U.S. law. The House included
any foreign corporation more than 50 percent owned by Americans regardless
of the location of its principal place of business. After considerable debate the
Senate approach prevailed with some important provisos set out in the Conference report:"
In receding to the Senate, the conferees recognized the inherent jurisdictional, enforcement, and diplomatic difficulties raised by the inclusion of foreign subsidiaries
of U.S. companies in the direct prohibitions of the bill. However, the conferees intend to make clear that any issuer or domestic concern which engages in bribery of
foreign officials indirectly through any other person or entity would itself be liable
under the bill. The conferees recognized that such jurisdictional, enforcement, and
diplomatic difficulties may not be present in the case of individuals who are U.S.
citizens, nationals, or residents. Therefore, individuals other than those specifically
covered by the bill (e.g., officers, directors, employees, agents, or stockholders acting
on behalf of an issuer or domestic concern) will be liable when they act in relation to
the affairs of any foreign subsidiary of an issuer or domestic concern if they are
citizens, nationals, or residents of the United States. In addition, the conferees determined that foreign nationals or residents otherwise under the jurisdiction of the
United States would be covered by the bill in circumstances where an issuer or
domestic concern engaged in conduct proscribed by the bill.
Furthermore, as has been noted," there are statements in the legislative history
that Section 102 is to be interpreted to preclude off books or slush fund transactions by subsidiaries and to require appropriate degrees of accounting control over subsidiaries.
The requirement of "corrupt" intent and the "obtaining or retaining
business" purpose test appear to exclude several types of payments reported to
the SEC in its voluntary program. The word corruptly was drawn from
criminal provisions on domestic bribery in United States law to suggest an evil
intent to deflect the recipient from his duty."' Coupled with a definition in the
ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, UNLAWFUL CORPORATE PAYMENTS ACT OF 1977, supra

note 35, at 6.
"COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES, supra note 24, at 14.

"See note 37, p. 20 as to relevant legislative history.
""The word corruptly connotes an evil motive or purpose such that as [sic] required under 18
U.S.C. 201(b), which prohibits domestic bribery. As in 18 U.S.C. 201(b), the word corruptly indicates an intent or desire to wrongfully influence the recipient. It does not require that the act be
fully consummated, or succeed in producing the desired outcome." SENATE COMM. ON BANKING,
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 12, No. 4

716

INTERNATIONAL LA WYER

statute of foreign official to exclude employees "whose duties are essentially
ministerial or clerical," the result is explained in the legislative history"" as excluding the sort of "grease" or "facilitating" payments which only accelerate
the performance of a duty and which were often reported to the SEC under its
voluntary program. The further requirement that any offer or payment, to be
illegal, must have been made "in order to assist.., in obtaining or retaining
business.. ., or directing business to, any person""0 may also exclude a variety
of foreign payments that have been reported to the SEC, e.g., payments to

avoid increased taxes (United Brands), to obtain approval of higher price ceilings (General Tire), or political contributions to maintain a favorable
regulatory climate (Exxon).

Furthermore, if the U.S. company can show a "true extortion" situation,
the Act's criminal provisions would not apply.
Sections 103 and 104 cover payments and gifts intended to influence the recipient,
regardless of who first suggested the payment or gift. The defense that the payment
was demanded on the part of a government official as a price for gaining entry into a
market or to obtain a contract would not suffice since at some point the U.S. company would make a conscious decision whether or not to pay a bribe. That the payment may have been first propsed by the recipient rather than the U.S. company does
not alter the corrupt purpose on the part of the person paying the bribe. On the other
hand true extortion situations would not be covered by this provision since a payment
to an official to keep an oil rig from being dynamited should not be held to be made
with the requisite corrupt purpose."

In a number of well publicized questionable payments episodes it appears that
payments were made in response to threats by foreign government officials to
HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, CORRUPT OVERSEAS PAYMENTS

BY U.S.

BUSINESS ENTERPRISES,

supra note 23, at 7 (Senate report on S. 3664, the predecessor to S. 305; HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, UNLAWFUL CORPORATE PAYMENTS ACT OF 1977, supra note 35,
at 8 (to a similar effect)).

4"'The
language of the bill is deliberately cast in terms which differentiate between such
payments and facilitating payments, sometimes called 'grease payments'. In using the word corruptly, the committee intends to distinguish between payments which cause an official to exercise
other than his free will in acting or deciding or influencing an act or decision and those payments
which merely move a particular matter toward an eventual act or decision or which do not involve
any discretionary action. In defining foreign official, the committee emphasizes this crucial
distinction by excluding from the definition of foreign official government employees whose
duties are essentially ministerial or clerical." HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, UNLAWFUL CORPORATE PAYMENTS ACT OF 1977, supra note 35, at 8. There are indications

that the Justice Department regards any payment to a policymaking foreign official as outside the
exclusion for "grease" or "facilitating" payments.

'IS. 305, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 103 (1977). The obtaining or retaining business purpose test
marks a narrowing of the test adopted by the Senate a year earlier in S. 3664, the predecessor to
S, 305. There the purpose included, in addition to obtaining or retaining business or directing
business to any person, the influencing of legislation or regulations. ForeignPayments Disclosure:
Hearingson H.R. 15481 and S. 3664, H.R. 13870 and H.R. 13953 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1976) (text of S. 3664, § 2).
"SENATE

COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES,

supra note 27, at 10-11.
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take tax or regulatory action that would effectively put U.S. local entities out
of business; this would seem to verge on "true extortion."
Given the above major principles of the Act on criminalization of bribery of
foreign government officials and the requirements of Section 102, what are
some of the practical problems likely to arise in complying with the Act? There
is not likely to be any disagreement with the policy expressed in the Act's
criminal provisions against bribery of foreign government officials and quite
possibly, for a variety of reasons, there will actually be few prosecutions under
the Act's criminal provisions. Nevertheless, counsel and management must
now develop guidance on such matters as the following, e.g.:
(i) When is a company likely top be deemed to have "reason to know" that
a portion of a payment of a commission to a sales agent abroad or of a legal
fee to local counsel will or may be used as a bribe?
The SEC Report 2 intimates that any fee or commission substantially in excess of the going rate may be presumptive evidence of a bribe, thereby implying a duty of inquiry in such cases. In light of the State Department's requirement of such certificates under the Arms Export Control Act," is it reasonable
for private parties to require the foreign recipient of the commission or fee to
provide a certificate that there will be no such diversion of the payment?
Unless the U.S. company had considerable market leverage, would foreign
sales agents or local counsel be likely to reject such requirements as an unwarranted questioning of their honesty? What ought to be done to avoid the situation alleged by Senator Proxmire in the Textron-Bell Helicopter case where a
foreign government official was alleged to be a silent partner participating in
the sales agent's commission or in other cases where government officials are
former (or present) members of the only available local law firms? Is there a
duty to inquire as to such ties? Does the Act make the retaining of relatives of
foreign government officials as sales agents or consultants in connection with
sales to the government suspect? What if local law requires utilization of local
sales agents or joint ventures with local entities and these local agents or partners advise that local law prevents their supplying information or reports
abroad of the type suggested?
(ii) What practice may companies safely follow with respect to entertaining
foreign government purchasers or paying for their visits to the seller's premises
in the United States?
(iii) What should a business entity do in a country where it is legal to make
political contributions and it is expected to do so? How can it document its
behavior so as to clearly be free of "corrupt" intent or a purpose to obtain or
retain business?
"SEC REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE
"22 C.F.R. § 130.22 (1977).

PAYMENTS,
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(iv) Even though the Act excludes "grease" or "facilitating" payments,
what sort of records should be kept to defend against charges that payments
made did not come within this exception?
(v) What is the obligation of U.S. management if the Section 102 books and
records requirements and internal accounting controls reveal that non-U.S.
personnel of its foreign subsidiaries (i.e., personnel clearly not subject to the
Act's criminal provisions) acting on their own have made payments to government officials, candidates or political parties which are not illegal under local
law?
(vi) What could be the exposure of U.S. management to U.S. criminal
liability for unauthorized corrupt payments made by a foreign agent or subsidiary under theories of conspiracy, aiding and abetting, accessory after the
fact or failure to impose adequate controls under Section 102?4 What is the
duty of disclosure in such cases? What would be the exposure to stockholder
suits?
(vii) Under what circumstances, if any, will there be a sufficient nexus with
the United States to apply Section 103 to acts abroad by non-U.S. employees
of foreign companies whose securities are registered with the SEC?
(viii) What sort of statements of company policy and what sort of compliance program to carry out this policy are desirable?
(ix) What degree of internal accounting control and legal review over the
acts of foreign subsidiaries is reasonable under the Act in light of such factors
as percentage of ownership, expense, volume of earnings and reports of the
prevalence of bribery in the local business environment?
With respect to foreign operations and the possibility that a bribe is the independent act of an individual rather than a corporation or its management,
the legislative history suggests that the quality of management's internal controls is highly relevant:
Whether or not a particular situation involves bribery by the corporation or by an individual acting on his own will depend on all the facts and circumstances, including
the position of the employee, the care with which the board of directors supervises
management, the care with which management supervises employees in sensitive posi-

"The committee fully recognizes that the proposed law will not reach all corrupt payments
overseas. For example, Sections 2 and 3 [of H.R. 3815] would not permit prosecution of a foreign
national who paid a bribe overseas acting entirely on his own initiative. The committee notes,
however, that in the majority of bribery cases investigated by the SEC some responsible official or
employee of the U.S. parent company had knowledge of the bribery and either explicity or implicitly approved the practice. Under the bill as reported, such persons could be prosecuted. The
concepts of aiding and abetting and joint participation would apply to a violation under this bill in
the same manner in which those concepts have always applied in both SEC civil actions and in implied private actions brought under the securities laws generally." HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE
AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, UNLAWFUL CORPORATE PAYMENTS ACT OF 1977, supra note 35, at 8.

InternationalLawyer, Vol. 12, No. 4

The Foreign CorruptPracticesAct of 1977

719

tions and its adherence to the strict accounting standards set forth under section
102."1
By virtue of a unique arrangement opposed by the executive branch but insisted on by Congress, the SEC has a substantial role in enforcement of the
Act's criminal provisions. 6 In addition to its responsibilities with respect to
the Section 102 provisions on books and internal accounting controls, the SEC
has responsibility for investigations of violations of the Section 103 criminal
provisions by SEC regulated issuers and for bringing civil injunctive actions to
enforce these provisions. Criminal prosecutions under Section 103 would be
referred to Justice which has responsibility for both investigations (utilizing
the FBI) and enforcement actions against domestic concerns under Section
104. Both the SEC and Justice are following a policy of refusing to render interpretive advice on the applicability of the Act's proscriptions to particular
7
factual situations.'
Although it is doubtful that the Act creates an implied private right of action
by injured parties, such as competitors, against management for damages
caused by payment of foreign bribes,5 ' there are potentialities for stockholder
suits both against management and independent auditors and counsel to enforce the Act with broad implications for future federal oversight of corporate
management both at home and abroad. In addition, the possibility of SEC
disciplinary action pursuant to Rule 2(e)' 9 of the Commission's Rules of Practice to disbar auditors and lawyers involved in violations of the Act must also
be considered.
IV. Conclusions
The extensive and continuing efforts of the U.S. government for three years
to promote multilateral solutions to foreign corruption issues have yet to
achieve a significant response abroad. Furthermore, although there has been
the most extensive scrutiny and publicity in the United States on U.S. business
participation in corruption abroad, there are reasons to believe that U.S. cor"SENATE

COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES,

supra note 27, at 11.
"HousE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, UNLAWFUL CORPORATE PAYMENTS

ACT OF 1977, supra note 35, at 9-10.
"SEC, Accounting Series Release No. 242, supra note 36.
"1123 CONG. REC. S 19,401 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Tower); 123 CONG. REC.

H 12,825 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Devine). Note, however, that the SEC in its
first release on the Act (SEC, Accounting Release No. 242, supra note 36, at 182) appeared to endorse the statement in the House Commerce Committee report that: "The Committee intends that
the courts shall recognize a private cause of action based on this legislation ... on behalf of persons who suffer injury as a result of prohibited corporate bribery." HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE
AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, UNLAWFUL CORPORATE PAYMENTS ACT OF 1977, supra note 35, at 10.

"17 C.F.R. 201.2(e). This possibility was endorsed in the reports of both the Senate Banking
and House Commerce Committees.
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porations have not been leaders in such tainted commerce. It is ironic under
these circumstances that the United States has, unilaterally, in the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 and a variety of other measures, enacted the
most comprehensive and draconian controls any home country has ever applied to the involvement of its multinational businesses in corruption abroad.
The SEC's program to require disclosure of foreign corrupt payments
played a central role in passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and the
Act in turn, gives statutory sanction to continued activism by the SEC in this
area. In Section 102 of the Act, the SEC has also received authority which has
important implications for all issuers, without regard to whether foreign
operations are involved.
As a result of enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, U.S.
multinational companies face several years of uncertainties in adjusting their
U.S. and worldwide operations to forthcoming interpretations of the Act by
counsel, their independent auditors, the SEC and Justice Department and the
courts. Similarly, foreign corporations whose issues are registered with the
SEC face pressures to adopt more extensive U.S. accounting controls and
possible application of the substantive prohibitions of the Act to episodes with
no more U.S. ties than incidental use of instrumentalities of interstate commerce. The need for realism in guidance on the issues involved and sound exercise of prosecutorial discretion in enforcing the Act is abundantly clear.
As noted, the range of U.S. controls developed in response to the foreign
questionable payments problem was already becoming extensive prior to
enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The need for coordination of
these existing programs of the SEC, IRS, and State Department, as well as of
the roles of the SEC and Justice in enforcement of the new legislation is much
clearer than is the path which will achieve such coordination.
There can be no doubt of the continuing strength of U.S. concern that the
problem of corrupt payments by international business be effectively addressed. Considerations that unilateral U.S. corrective measures might impair
the competitiveness of U.S. business abroad have not been allowed to delay
these measures. But it would be an illusion to believe that such unilateral
enactments as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act or U.S. insistence on extraterritorial international application of various corporate governance
reforms can effectively control the problem or often be enforced without the
support of wider international agreement on the subject. Pending such wider
agreement, the management of U.S. multinational business will be forced by
the new Act to play the difficult role of ambassadors for the "new
governance" in a variety of foreign environments where local customs and
local law will be different and perhaps even hostile.
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